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On its distinctive facts, Fowler v. Board of Education of Lincoln
County, Kentucky' is almost ideally suited as a vehicle for reex-
amining some of the "deeper" issues associated with the in-school
speech of public high school teachers in particular and with free
speech law in general. In light of its facts and the prior case
law, it is hardly surprising that Fowler evoked three separate
and distinct responses from the Sixth Circuit panel deciding the
case. This Article, through a shift in the formulation of the precise
issues presented, presents a fourth approach. The justification
for this apparently perverse multiplication of complexity is simply
that it allows us to see the virtues of each of the three approaches
taken by the Sixth Circuit, while, at the same time, enabling us
to examine each approach's limitations under the circumstances
of Fowler.
To begin by temporarily oversimplifying, Fowler involved a
tenured public high school teacher who was subjected to the
rather draconian sanction of dismissal after a school board hear-
ing because she had showed a popular "R" rated movie on a non-
instructional day to her morning and afternoon class of fourteen
to seventeen year old students, while exercising only desultory
attempts to edit the video portion of the movie.'
At the federal court trial on her wrongful discharge claim, the
teacher, Jacqueline Fowler, was awarded reinstatement and money
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1. 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987) [petition for writ of certiorari to be sought in September,
1987, per counsel for appellant].
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damages.3 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, her judgment was
vacated and her claim dismissed. 4 No single approach commanded
a majority of the Sixth Circuit panel. To oversimplify the law as
much as the facts, Judge Milburn concluded that Fowler had not
engaged in speech containing the expressive or communicative
elements necessary to invoke the protection of the free speech
clause.5 Judge Peck, while concurring in the majority result,
reasoned that Ms. Fowler had engaged in constitutionally pro-
tected speech, and had shown that her protected speech was a
substantial and motivating factor in the School Board's decision
to discharge her. However, in his view, the Board had then met
its burden of showing that it would have dismissed her for her
conduct and poor judgment anyway. That is, Judge Peck con-
cluded that the court had not premised its decision upon those
aspects of her speech or conduct that were constitutionally pro-
tected, nor upon any motivation on the part of the Board to
impose sanctions attributable to such protected activity.6 Judge
Merritt dissented. In his view, at least some protected speech,
either in the category of instruction or entertainment, was pres-
ent. In contrast to Judge Peck, he concluded that the Board had
failed to prove that Fowler's speech was severable into protected"substance," messages, or meanings on the one hand, and unpro-
tected means, or "form," featuring violence, sexuality, and vul-
garity on the other. In his view, the Board did not meet its
burden of showing that it would have terminated Fowler for reasons
other than its admitted disagreement with the substance and
presumed messages of the film. 7
II. THE MILBURN OPINION: THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF
PROTECTED SPEECH
Most, but not all, of the facts underlying the Fowler case were
not in serious dispute. It is more generally the constitutional
significance of the underlying facts that guides the case's reso-
lution. Judge Milburn's opinion recites most of the relevant facts,
3. Id. at 658, 660.
4. Id. at 658.
5. Id. at 664.
6. Id. at 667-68 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
7. Id. at 668-70 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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including those already briefly alluded to, but it deals as well
with some facts reasonably viewable as ultimately irrelevant. For
example, he reports that the statutory grounds cited by the
School Board for dismissing Ms. Fowler in July of 1984 had
included alleged insubordination and conduct unbecoming a
teacher.8 Since he proceeded to determine that the "conduct
unbecoming a teacher" standard was applicable and met in this
case, 9 and that it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad
as applied to Ms. Fowler's conduct, 10 he had no occasion to reach
the grounds of alleged insubordination."
The underlying activity at issue was Ms. Fowler's apparently
unilateral decision to show the "R" rated movie, Pink Floyd-The
Wall, to her ninth through eleventh grade public high school
classes on the last day of the 1983-84 school year. This was a"noninstructional" day during which teachers devoted their at-
tention to completing report cards. 12 A "noninstructional" school-
day, an institution bespeaking remarkable complacency in the
face of the apparent gradual deterioration of American educa-
tional standards, apparently involves, depending upon one's choice
of metaphor, the babysitting or warehousing of students, who
remain in the physical custody of their teachers, without there
necessarily being any effort made to educate them. While there
may be some sort of low-level pedagogy involved-e.g., tech-
niques of collectively coping with enforced time wasting-the
day is apparently best described as non-curricular, or as a hybrid
school-nonschool day.
The particular circumstances in which alleged speech, or alleg-
edly protected speech, may be evaluated on a noninstructional
day may prove to be of legal benefit to a plaintiff teacher in Ms.
Fowler's situtation. The teacher may be able to construct a valid
argument that balances the interests of the public or the school
in efficiently attaining its reasonable pedagogical objectives against
her interests as a teacher' s in freely speaking on arguably rele-
8. Id. at 658.
9. Id. at 666.
10. Id. at 664-66.
11. Id. at 666 n.10.
12. Id. at 658.
13. Presumably, the students may have interests both in their own socialization and
education according to prevailing community conceptions and in their role as audience
for the exercise of their teacher's free speech rights.
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vant subjects.14 She could plausibly argue that the state's interest
is reduced, if not utterly waived, implicitly, by the very character
of a noninstructional custodial school day.
The movie in question was apparently one with which Ms. Fowler
was unfamiliar.15 The students themselves had suggested bringing
it in.16 Despite some reservations,' 7 Ms. Fowler had made arrange-
ments to accommodate their request, apparently motivated by a
desire to keep them occupied18 and entertained 9 as she concen-
trated on the task of posting grades. She had deputized one of
her students, age fifteen, to exercise censorial editing authority over
the video portion of the movie, arming him with a file folder for
his use in screening out unsuitable scenes.20 The student had
evidently been left effectively in charge on those several occa-
sions on which Ms. Fowler left the room for unspecified lengths
of time.21 She had consulted several persons, including students,
on the propriety of showing the film, 22 but did not herself preview
it.23 No one suggests that a less potentially objectionable movie
could not have been selected.
It is possible to question the relevance of Ms. Fowler's failure
to screen the film for classroom suitability in advance. For
example, a teacher may well have a legitimate expectation of free
speech protection if under appropriate circumstances she were to
assign an acknowledged classic work on her own initiation, on
the strength of its general cultural reputation, intending to im-
part or convey some sort of broad social idea, whether she wishes
to affirmatively endorse such an idea or not. The availability
of such protection would not depend upon her screening of the
work in advance, even if it turned out to contain passages
arguably unsuitable for the audience in question. The teacher in
this situation could be regarded as having constitutionally "spo-
14. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). This article will simply
assume that Ms. Fowler's ordinary day-to-day subject matter teaching responsibilities
encompassed what she assumed to be the themes or import of the movie in question.
15. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 658.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 665-66.
19. Id. at 664 n.8; id. at 669-70 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 658.
21. Id. at 659.
22. Id. at 658.
23. Id.
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ken," through the partially unfamiliar words of another.
On the other hand, Ms. Fowler's failure to preview a movie,
the contents of which were unknown to her, for whatever reasons,
seems to indicate her intent merely to occupy and entertain her
students, rather than to convey, even if merely for purposes of
reflection or discussion, any sort of rudimentary social idea to
them.2 What she knew, or could reasonably be charged with
knowing, at the time of her initial decision to show the movie,
was its apparent popularity, its "R" rating, any rumors of its
controversial scenes which may have reached her, and the ages
of both her intended audience and of her chosen student censoring
agent. As it turns out, her student monitor's editing attempts,
however effective, were arguably irrelevant, except insofar as
the inherent sufficiency of the method chosen reflected on Ms.
Fowler's judgment and sense of responsibility. The audio portion
of the movie by itself apparently "contained enough offensive
language to mandate an automatic 'R' rating under motion picture
industry standards,"' 25 and it had been played uninterruptedly. 26
Ms. Fowler presumably would have been aware of this, at the
very latest by the time of her second afternoon screening of the
movie.
A reasonable public could find Ms. Fowler's conduct and deci-
sions to be excessively casual and ill-considered. Such a public
attitude would, of course, not suffice to deprive otherwise con-
stitutionally permissible conduct of its protection. But such an
attitude could reinforce a broad public determination to insure
that to the greatest extent possible, and otherwise consistent
with the free speech clause, decisions as to curriculum, materials,
and teaching methods should be left to the more direct, more
politically responsible agents of the democratic electorate-the
school board, and, in turn, its most directly responsible subordi-
nates or agents, the superintendents and principals-rather
than to individual classroom teachers. In effect, a reasonable
democratic electorate could determine, based on its assessment
24. This writer has proposed such a standard as a minimally necessary condition for
invoking the free speech clause, without, however, to this point attracting the majority
support of the members of the Supreme Court. See Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill
for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 149, 156, 166.
25. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 659.
26. Id.
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of the level of skill and judgment that it might expect, or that
it wished to pay for, among the range of individual classroom
teachers, that teacher contracts should be drafted and interpreted
to reasonably minimize the level of judgment and discretion
authorized at their level.
Judge Milburn concluded that two of the factual findings of
the district court were clearly erroneous. These findings had
dealt with the degree of actual success achieved by the student-
monitor armed with the file folder in editing the visual portion
of the movie at both showings and on whether Ms. Fowler
had formed an opinion as to the significance or value of the film
at some point during the morning showing.27 At least arguably,
though, Judge Milburn's findings of clear error on the part of
the trial court were not necessary to reach his result. If the
School Board's case otherwise fell into place, the mere fact that
Ms. Fowler had shown the film with unedited "R"-rated audio in
the afternoon session, after having been made aware of its
character during the morning screening could, by itself, supply
sufficient grounds for sanctions. Similarly, her opinion as to the
significance of the film, (despite the imperfect attention she gave
to this evaluation), is at least arguably irrelevant to any alleged
improprieties visited upon her captive, if eager, student audience
prior to the point at which she formed this opinion.
There are two sticking points for Ms. Fowler's case at this
juncture. The first, less significant, problem is that strictly speak-
ing, the mere forming of an opinion as to the movie's significance,
whether such an opinion was formed or crystallized during or
after the screening of the movie, is not precisely the same thing
as developing an intent, general or specific, that the film be
shown to communicate some sort of broad social idea. In a
word, a teacher's estimation or appreciation of a movie is not
equivalent to her intent to convey what is held in estimation,
even if without endorsement or approval.28
The second sticking point, already alluded to, is that intent to
convey an idea does not operate retroactively. A fair reading of
27. Id. at 659 n.1.
28. At trial, Ms. Fowler testified that she believed in her designated student editor's
statement that he had faithfully continued to edit the visual portion of the movie while
she was out of the room. It is unclear whether the 15 year old student editor was chosen
for his ability to heroically resist peer pressure, or for his ability to edit while averting
his own eyes from the screen.
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the testimony establishes that there was some period of time, at
least during the morning showing of the movie, in which Ms.
Fowler intended that it be shown, for whatever reasons, but did
not apparently intend to convey, with or without endorsement,
any particular, even rudimentary, sort of broad social idea. Judge
Milburn's opinion can be read as asserting that if something like
this intent to convey a social idea is not present, constitutionally
protected speech is also not present. In this view, Ms. Fowler
could raise no free speech defense2 against allegations based on
or stemming from those segments of time preceding the point at
which she formed the requisite intent. Of course, while such an
assertion is quite sensible on many counts,30 it suffers the defect
of not being one to which the Supreme Court has proved willing
to subscribe.3 1
To the extent that the contemporaneous intent of a putative
speaker was decisive on the issue of whether speech in the
relevant sense is present, the other factors discussed by Judge
Milburn would not be decisive, or even relevant. If it were to be
29. While a teacher might claim to be vindicating the free speech or freedom-to-hear
rights of her student audience, it is doubtful that, on the merits, any violation of student
free speech rights can be asserted under the facts of Fowler. See generally Wright, Free
Speech Values, Public Schools, and the Role of Judicial Deference, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV.
601 (1987). For a sampling of the range of views on student speech rights in the public
schools, see Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981); Freeman, The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of
Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1984); Gardner, Liberty and Compulsory Education,
in OF LIBERTY 109 (A.P. Griffiths ed. 1983); Garvey, Children and the First Amendment,
57 TEX. L. REV. 321 (1979); Guttman, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal
Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to the "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 605; Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker:
The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RfEV. 278 (1970);
Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976 ILL. L.
FORUM 746; van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to
Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197 (1983).
30. See generally Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985
SuP. CT. REV. 149.
31. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (extending
some measure of free speech protection, of indeterminate strength, to ordinary commercial
live nude dancing). Note the willingness of the Court to countenance state law restrictions
on commercial nude dancing that would be unthinkable as applied to more central or
"core" modes of "speech," as in City of Newport, Ky. v. Iacobucci, 107 S. Ct. 383 (1986)
(per curiam); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellancana, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
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found that Ms. Fowler had the requisite intent to broach or
convey some sort of broad social idea, it would be immaterial,
on the issue of speech vel non, that she had not previously
screened the movie, that her attention had been otherwise oc-
cupied, that she had been absent from the room for periods of
time, and even that she had not attempted to explain or discuss
the film before or after either screening.3 2 It would seem perfectly
possible, for example, to have both the requisite idea-conveyance
intent about, say, the movie Shoah, or Richard Attenborough's
Gandhi, and yet to otherwise detach oneself from the film, as
Ms. Fowler did.33
To the extent that she merely formed, eventually, a considered
opinion that "the movie contained important, socially valuable
messages,"' 34 the problem of her contemporaneous intent remains.
Of course, to the extent that the precise issue is that of speech
vel non, courts are, and should be, reluctant to inquire into or
independently assess the speaker's claim that the speech or
material involved is "really" important, or valuable. The kind of
contemporaneous intent that a speaker must evidence varies,
however, with the way in which the legal problem is conceived.
There is more than one way to conceptualize Ms. Fowler's legal
circumstances. First, one might reasonably view what transpired
as essentially outside the established school curriculum, but
still involving an issue of free speech in the context of a public
high school, with a teacher as the putative speaker. In this
conception, the case would be thought of as a teacher-speech
analogue to the student speech cases, the most authoritative of
which are Bethel School District No. 403 v. Frase7- and Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.3 6 This was
32. See Fowler, 819 F.2d at 659-60.
33. Perhaps more controversially, it may be true that nothing can take the place of
the requisite intent. At least arguably, the free speech clause should not, at least
considering the putative speaker's interest alone, protect a school teacher who distributes
copies of War and Peace to her students under the bizarre misapprehension that the
books are only paperweights, intended as useful gifts. This would be so even if the
teacher later discovers his mistake and decides, in retrospect, that it was a splendid
thing that his students were exposed to the broad social "ideas" conveyed through the
novel.
34. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 660.
35. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
36. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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the predominant view taken, and the line of cases principally
emphasized, by Judge Milburn.37
An alternative view, and one which may be preferable because
of its greater concreteness and specificity, would be to consider
Ms. Fowler's case as one involving the dismissal of a public
employee for exercising free speech rights in the course of her
employment. In this conception, the most useful authority would
then be cases such as Connick v. Myers~s and Pickering v. Board
of Education.3 9 This alternative view was touched upon, but not
logically pressed, by Judge Milburn.40
Which of these two distinct lines of cases is applied will
determine whether one finds Judge Milburn's result justifiable
or not. The thrust of the judge's rationale is that for speech to
qualify as constitutionally protected, a speaker must, at a mini-
mum, have a contemporaneous, expressive or communicative4l
intent to convey a "particularized message"42 in circumstances
indicating a great likelihood that it "would be understood by
those who viewed it."43 But in light of at least some Supreme
Court case law in the general area of free speech, these alleged''minimum requirements" do not reflect the law in all free speech
contexts.
This should not be surprising, despite the obvious logic in some
of Judge Milburn's rationale. It is difficult to believe that the
law would recognize as protected speech a college course assign-
ment of Kahil Gibran's The Prophet, in view of its likely compre-
hensibility, but that it would deny protection to an otherwise
similar assignment of Heidegger's Being and Time, on grounds
that it would have a low probability of being understood by the
students, any ambition and optimism of the assigning professor
aside. The apt gridiron simile would be that "speech" is more
37. See in particular Fowler, 819 F.2d at 661.
38. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
39. 391 U.S. 563 (1988). See also the recent case of Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S.
Ct. 2891 (1987) (clerical employee in county constable's office not dismissable under the
circumstances for orally endorsing to a co-worker a hypothetical future assassination of
President Reagan).
40. See Fowler, 819 F.2d at 662.
41. See id. at 664.
42. See id. at 662.
43. Id. at 663.
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like "a pass" than "a completed pass." And as we have seen, the
Supreme Court has seen fit to extend at least some measure of
free speech protection to activities that, it is fair to say, do not
invariably involve an intent to convey a particularized message.
An example would be commercial nude dancing which does not
pretend to communicate anything other than entertainment.44
It is, therefore, perfectly possible to characterize the Fowler
case as an entertainment-speech, teacher-speech analogue to the
political-speech, student-speech case of Tinker. Since neither
teachers nor students shed their free speech rights at the school-
house gate,45 and since "entertainment" speech, devoid of any
particularized message, may be constitutionally protectable, Judge
Milburn's opinion offers no direct rebuttal to this characteriza-
tion. His rebuttal is really more a matter of perspective, a per-
spective which drives his selection of the "appropriate"
precedent.46
Accordingly, viewing Fowler as a public employee dismissal
case in which the dismissal is contended to violate the employee's
free speech rights, one reaches a result more consistent with
that of Judge Milburn. This is because it has been clearly estab-
lished in the speech-based dismissal cases, that it is necessary
for a terminated employee to show not merely that she "spoke,"
but that her speech "may be 'fairly characterized as constituting
speech on a matter of public concern."' 47 This is an inquiry of
law, rather than of fact,48 and is determined by reference to the
content, form, and context of the utterance as gleaned from the
44. See supra note 31. See also, e.g., Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d
1060, 1063 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (free speech protection
for the right to produce jazz concerts); Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983) (bands marching in Philadelphia Mummers
parade engaged in a form of expressive entertainment protected by the first amendment).
45. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
46. See generally Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
47. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2897 (1987) (quoting Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). Often, the court's formulation requires a showing that the em-
ployee speech have been on a matter "of public interest:' See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 982 (1984); Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 1464, 1468 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd
per curiam, 734 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1984). For an examination of the concept of speech
on matters of public interest or concern in the public employee dismissal and libel
contexts, see generally Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37
DEPAUL L. REV. (1987).
48. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7, 150 n.10.
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entire record.49 The best that can be said about the speech fairly
attributable to Ms. Fowler is that it does not easily fit within
the presumed antithesis of speech on a matter of public interest
or concern-speech on matters of merely private or personal
concern.50 Ms. Fowler was not merely airing some narrow per-
sonalized grievance.
On the other hand, what Ms. Fowler sought to "say" via the
offending film, at the time, was essentially that her audience
should be entertained and occupied. This was not speech on a
matter or subject of general public interest or concern. The
speech, therefore, intended only as entertainment, would not be
constitutionally protected. This is because speech intended to
entertain is protected only in an appropriate context (e.g., nude
dancing is protected expression in a barroom but not a school
room). Nude dancing does not qualify as expression addressing
matters of public interest or concern. It is protected on a com-
pletely different basis. Therefore, in the context of a public
employee discharge, Fowler's free speech challenge would fail,
without any need for interest balancing or any motivation an-
alysis of the School Board's decision. 51
. It should be noted, however, that such distinctions are, in
practice, a bit less tidy than this. The Supreme Court has, for
whatever reasons, insisted that even where a public employee's
speech does not address matters of public concern, such speech
is not 'totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment."' 52
It is tempting to suggest in response that if the speech in question
does not address a matter of public interest or concern, the
values or aims underlying the free speech clause5 are presumably
no more strongly implicated than they would be in a variety of
obviously non-speech contexts. In any event, the Court has pro-
nounced, that "absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom
49. See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897.
50. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1982).
51. See the burden-shifting process required under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) once the threshold speech on matters of public interest or
concern test is met.
52. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897 n.7 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
53. See the discussion of the broad purposes generally thought to inform the free
speech clause in Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963).
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of a personnel decision taken by a public agency in reaction to
the employee's behavior,"'' at least in the absence of speech
addressing matters of public interest and concern.
Now, a person in the position of Ms. Fowler would no doubt
feel a strong temptation to argue that her speech had in fact,
addressed matters of public interest. It would certainly be pos-
sible to interpret Pink Floyd-The Wall as addressing broad and
important social issues of alienation, educational repression, and
general authoritarianism. 5  But the issue is not whether it is
possible to find social value in the movie, but rather whether
the speaker intended that value to be conveyed at the time the
movie was shown. It is clear that, at least for a time, Ms. Fowler
intended only to entertain and occupy her students. She was
unaware during this time of the film's content. Consequently, the
film was not even a "subject" of speech, let alone a subject of
general community interest or concern.
This result need not be intellectually disquieting. A speaker
has only a limited practical interest, at best, in things not in-
tended to be conveyed at the time of speaking. This is clear from
a broader perspective. It would seem unlikely, for example, that
a society would be enthusiastic about fighting and dying on
foreign battle fields to protect a free speech right to "say" things
utterly unintentionally. Accordingly, it is unlikely that constitu-
tional drafters would have intended to give special protection to
such a right.
Of course, it is also possible to argue that showing an edited
version of a movie rumored to be sexually suggestive is itself
some sort of a "statement" on a matter of public interest. In this
view, the editing itself is seen to be a statement as to the pro-
priety of showing such movies to persons under seventeen, quite
apart from any other message that might be derived through
the film's thematic content or implications. The problem with
this argument is simply that, in its looseness, it proves too much.
Every act of insider trading, of euthanasia, or of drinking and
driving, in some sense implies a "speaker" who in effect "says"
something like "I approve of, or am willing to tolerate, insider
trading/euthanasia/drinking and driving under at least some cir-
54. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897 n.7 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
55. See the reported testimony of Ms. Fowler, Fowler, 819 F.2d at 659, and the assess-
ment of Judge Merritt, id. at 668, 669 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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cumstances." The Framers obviously did not intend to convert
every controversial act into a constitutionally protected "state-
ment" on the rationale that the act addressed a matter of public
interest because it challenged established public policy.
Focusing on the appropriate precedents, then, it would be
perfectly reasonable to dismiss Ms. Fowler's free speech claim
without any balancing of interests or analysis of the Board's
motivation, though not precisely along the lines adopted by Judge
Milburn. Seeking to blunt the effect of precedent such as the
Schad commercial nude dancing case, Judge Milburn correctly
notes that the Supreme Court "has ... indicated that in determin-
ing whether a given type of entertainment is protected by the
First Amendment, it will look to the kind of entertainment
involved and the appropriateness of the entertainment under the
circumstances such as the time and place where offered.."57 The
Court has applied this rationale even in speech-based dismissal
cases, but only at that stage of analysis at which it seeks to
determine whether the public employee's interest in the speech,
and that of the public, outweighs the employer's and the public's
interest in the efficient, unjudicialized operation, at a reasonable
level of morale, of the public office in question." At such a stage,
the "manner, time, and place"59 of the speech at issue becomes
relevant. But this inquiry is undertaken only after it is first
determined that speech, itself, and further, speech addressing a
matter of public interest, is present.60
This should not be a surprising result. It is hardly obvious
why the question as to whether an utterance or an act is speech
at all should depend upon whether a school board (or a trial or
reviewing court) finds it to be appropriate under the circum-
stances. This logic concludes that "inappropriate speech" is not
only unprotected, but a contradiction in terms. Inevitably, one
must distinguish the threshold question: "Is this speech in the
constitutional sense?" from the follow up question, "If it is, do
we want to protect this speech under these circumstances from
56. See 452 U.S. at 65-66.
57. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 664 n.8.
58. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
59. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
60. See id. at 149-54.
19881
292 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:279
the sanction at issue?"61 Judge Milburn's response to Schad may
mark this distinction insufficiently.
With the speech issue behind him, Judge Milburn then briefly
addresses Ms. Fowler's claims that the operative Kentucky
statute, 2 which permits dismissal for "conduct unbecoming a
teacher," is unconstitutionally vague, that it did not provide her
with adequate notice of the likelihood of discipline for her conduct,
and that her conduct did not fall within the intended or estab-
lished scope of its provisions. Judge Milburn rejects all of these
contentions.63
Ms. Fowler's vagueness challenge to the statutory language of"conduct unbecoming a teacher" implicates the classic due process
principle which bars application of a statute that "either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."6 4 An inevitable tension arises in''vagueness" analysis when courts attempt to decide whether the
language of the statute, in fact, makes it difficult to apply in
borderline cases, or whether the plaintiff is simply asserting''vagueness" as a means of evading compliance with its literal
terms.
The phrase "conduct unbecoming a teacher" is, unless judicially
or administratively narrowed, hopelessly vague in borderline
cases. Reasonable minds could differ as to its intended scope in
at least some cases, even if not in Ms. Fowler's case itself. Yet,
it must be said that whether hers was a borderline case or not,
Ms. Fowler sped recklessly past clear, particularized warning
signs. In showing an unpreviewed "R" rated movie to students
known to be, in some cases, at least two years below the age
normally allowed admittance to such movies, even though a
desultory attempt at editing and supervision was made, and in
apparently not exploring the students' reactions to the film at
all,6 5 Ms. Fowler engaged in conduct that could be objected to in
61. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 89-92 (1982) (distinguishing
between the "coverage" and "protection" of a right).
62. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 161.790(1)(b) (Baldwin 1986).
63. See Fowler, 819 F.2d at 664, 666.
64. Id. at 664 (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
65. Id.
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almost purely quantitative terms. The risks of such conduct were
predictable by her at the time.
What might, to an outsider, seem less predictable was the
ferocity of the School Board in imposing on a tenured, fourteen
year veteran teacher66 the sanction of permanent dismissal as a
penalty for such conduct. While some might infer an attitude of
defiance from Ms. Fowler's statement that she would show the
film again if given the chance67 her attitude appears more pre-
cisely to have been only that "she would show an edited version
of the movie again if given the opportunity to explain it."68
Less sympathetically, it might be said that due process does
not require reasonable predictability of the most severe but other-
wise permissible sanction. More broadly, the School Board's interpre-
tation of, or resort to, a statute, and even the terms of the
statute itself, in the long term, are no less bargainable by teach-
ers' unions on behalf of their members than any other non-
economic issue. In principle, it should be possible for those who
bargain on behalf of teachers to extract a policy of moderation
in this regard from the school boards in exchange, perhaps for
modest concessions by the teachers in other areas.6 9 To the extent
that public school teachers have focused in their contract bar-
gaining solely upon issues unrelated to teacher discipline, they
deserve no more and no less sympathy than we would ordinarily
give to other competent adults who knowingly choose to accept
risks in exchange for other benefits.
In deciding the final issue as to whether the conduct of Ms.
Fowler fell, as a matter of statutory interpretation, within the
scope of "conduct unbecoming a teacher," Judge Milburn relied
upon two recent Kentucky cases involving conduct that would
ordinarily be regarded as more egregious than that engaged in
by Ms. Fowler. In Board of Education v. Wood,70 two teachers
had committed the criminal act of smoking marijuana in their
apartment with two fifteen-year-old students." In Board of
66. Id. at 658.
67. Id. at 660-61.
68. Id. at 659-60.
69 See generally Wright, A Contractual Theory of Due Process, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 527
(1987).
71. 717 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1986).
71. Id. at 839-40.
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Education v. McCollum, 72 a teacher was discharged under the"conduct unbecoming a teacher" provision for filing false sick
leave affidavits and lying about time spent on a special home
instruction program.73 The latter case at least involved a wilful,
insubordinate rule violation, as compared to Ms. Fowler's mere
lack of judgment and general irresponsibility.
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Wood explained that:
The purpose of teacher tenure laws is to promote good order in
the school system by preventing the arbitrary removal of capable
and experienced teachers by political or personal whim .... A
teacher is held to a standard of personal conduct which does not
permit the commission of immoral or criminal acts because of the
harmful impression made on the students. The school teacher has
traditionally been regarded as a moral example for the students.7 4
Both sides in the Fowler case could have reasonably drawn some
comfort from this generalized judicial statement of statutory
purpose. Ms. Fowler can reasonably have called her discharge"political" in a broad sense of the term, but not in a narrow,
partisan sense. Her actions were, it is true, not "immoral" in the
egregious sense at issue in Wood. In that case, students had been
encouraged to intentionally violate the criminal law. However, a
reasonable board of education could nevertheless refer to Ms.
Fowler's conduct as immoral without speaking eccentrically. Ar-
guably, she did not on this occasion set a "moral example" for
her students.
If general statements of statutory purpose such as those ex-
pounded in Wood do not satisfactorily resolve the applicability
of the statute to Ms. Fowler's conduct, then the resolution might
be found in the legal principle that encourages federal courts to
defer to reasonable interpretations of state stautes made by local
administrative agencies. The principle is well established that if
a state statute does not by its own terms unambiguously compel
a particular interpretation, the courts are still not authorized to
substitute their own interpretation for a reasonable one made by
the local factfinder. 75 It would seem, in this regard, excessive to
72. 721 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1986).
73. See id. at 704.
74. 717 S.W.2d at 839.
75. The leading recent case along these lines is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984). See also the recent case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207,
1224-25 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) and Hillsborough County, Florida
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985).
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categorize the interpretation and application of the statutory
standard made by the school board in the Fowler case as unrea-
sonable, even if reasonable minds could differ on the result.
Of course, it is possible to question whether this degree of
judicial deference is due in this case. Fowler does not involve a
highly technical interpretation by a centralized administrative
agency based on special accumulated expertise, 76 at least in any
rigorous sense, nor does it involve any formally promulgated
prior interpretation by the agency.77 Nevertheless, once all con-
stitutional issues are set aside, it seems clear that due sensitivity
to the values of localized democratic decision making and insti-
tutional legitimacy demands deference by unelected federal courts
to the reasonable interpretations of a state statute that implicates
local social values, made by a local politically responsible body.
III. THE PECK OPINION: A JUSTIFIED DISMISSAL DESPITE THE
PRESENCE OF SPEECH
Judge Peck concurred in the result with Judge Milburn.78 He would
have conceded that Ms. Fowler's conduct involved constitutionally
protected speech,79 but would have gone on to conclude that the
School Board could have legitimately dismissed Ms. Fowler if its
decision had been based on or motivated by constitutionally
permissible grounds exclusively. 0
Judge Peck began by correctly noting that much of the au-
thority relied upon by Judge Milburn to conclude that speech in
a constitutional sense was not present in Fowler had principally dealt
with symbolic conduct. Those cases, he pointed out, which had
addressed the circumstances under which symbolic conduct could
constitute protected speech, "do not lend themselves to the
reverse purpose of defining what kind of communication cannot
be expressive."81 We have seen above, 2 however, that while
Judge Milburn's particular approach to the issue of speech vel
non is suspect, his result may be defensible on other grounds.
76. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382,
383 (1961)).
77. See id. at 843-44.
78. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 666-68 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
79. Id. at 667 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
80. Id. at 668 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
81. Id. at 667 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
82. See "supra notes 24-61 and accompanying text.
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Judge Peck did not discuss the threshold83 issue of whether,
under the Pickering-Connick line of cases, Ms. Fowler's speech
rose to the level of speech addressing a matter of public interest
or concern.84 Instead, Judge Peck would have held that the trial
court "erred in its finding that, but for Ms. Fowler's constitu-
tionally protected activity of communicating various ideas and
political thoughts to her students, she would not have been
fired."85
Under the Mount Healthy mixed employer motive test, a plain-
tiff employee must show that her constitutionally protected con-
duct or speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
board's decision to dismiss her, but the board must then be
given the opportunity to show that it would have reached the
same decision if it only considered her unprotected conduct.,6
Consistent with the Mount Healthy approach, Judge Peck sought
to distinguish between permissible and impermissible motivations
affecting the Board's decision to discharge Ms. Fowler. He rea-
soned that since courts were required to give deference to rea-
sonable school board decisions, it was appropriate for the Fowler
court to find that the Board in that case had relied only upon
permissible considerations in its decision to dismiss Ms. Fowler.
In making this argument, Judge Peck refers to the "intertwining"
of permissible and impermissible grounds affecting the Board's
decision to dismiss Ms. Fowler 87 andohe is criticized for this by
Judge Merritt in dissent.8 However, Judge Peck's choice of the
term "inadequate" is misleading; he clearly means something essen-
tially opposite. If permissible and impermissible motivations were in
fact, inseparably, inextricably intertwined, the Board could hardly
83. See, e.g., Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
84. That one intends to apply a Mount Healthy mixed-employer motive inquiry does
not obviate the prior need to show speech on a matter of public interest. See Wren v.
Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1986); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508. 1512 (11th
Cir. 1986). While Wren and Ferrara take the most logical approach in integrating
Pickering, Connick, and Mount Healthy, a variety of less convincing approaches have been
judicially endorsed. See the interesting, if somewhat dismaying, discussion in Hatcher v.
Board of Pub. Educ. and Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1556 & 1556 n.19 (11th Cir. 1987).
85. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 667-68 (Peck, J., concurring in result).
86. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 433 (9th Cir.
1987); Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1984).
87. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 668 (Peck, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 669, 670 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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have discharged its burden of showing that the impermissible mo-
tivations were not a but-for cause of the discipline.8 9
It is, therefore, crucial to Judge Peck's analysis that permis-
sible and impermissible board motivations be distinguishable. To
a degree, this seems to have been possible in the instant case.
Ms. Fowler's poor judgment in not previewing the "R"-rated film
and her casualness in providing only for a student monitor armed
with a file folder to "edit" out objectionable segments seem to
constitute permissible considerations that the Board might have
relied upon to dismiss her. These seem as severable from imper-
missible board considerations, such as mere ideological disagree-
ment, as circumstances are commonly likely to admit.
But, more controversially, Judge Peck also seeks to distinguish
between "improper" considerations (such as perceived anti-estab-
lishment or anti-authoritarian political or social themes or mes-
sages in the film) and "proper" considerations (including vulgarity,
violence, sexuality, and general unsuitability for the age group
involved).9
His opinion gives us no reason to believe that there is any
surgical distinction between such impermissible "content" moti-
vations and permissible "form" motivations, beyond the roughest
approximation. At least where the speaker has intended to en-
dorse, or at least raise for consideration, a message of liberation
and anti-authoritarianism, and is disciplined for doing so, it is
entirely open for her to argue that such punishment, allegedly
based on vulgarity of "form," in effect requires her to send a
different "message." To require a change in form is to require a
change in content. One is, in effect, not saying the same thing,9 1
or saying it as powerfully 9 2 While this observation can be
overdrawn 93 -one can imagine a less vulgar formulation being in
fact, both more articulate and more powerful-it evidently has
89. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
90. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 668 (Peck, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protec-
tion, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 19 n.98 (1974).
92. See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 141 (1981); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 244 (1983); Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 107, 142 (1982).
93. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
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some force, at least as regards certain of the considerations that
are allegedly constitutionally permissible in Judge Peck's analy-
sis 94
IV. THE MERRITT OPINION: AN UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSAL BASED
ON SPEECH
At least by inference, the essential thrust of Judge Merritt's
dissenting opinion has been discussed above. In brief, he deter-
mined that the movie in question presented a message warning
of the adverse consequences of excessive authoritarianism. 95 He
observed that what may strike one federal judge as "gross and
bizarre " 96 may seem to another to be "mild and not very 'sexually
suggestive.."' 97 In this, Judge Merritt echoed the aesthetic rela-
tivism embodied in Justice Harlan's classic observation that "it
is .. .often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."98
Judge Merritt was able to deploy the commercial nude dancing
case of Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephriam against Judge
Milburn's apparent claim that pure entertainment could not fall
within the scope of constitutionally protected speech, but as we
have seen,100 this ambitious premise was unnecessary to Judge
Milburn's central argument. However, his position is less clear
with respect to Judge Peck's argument that the court should be
deferential in determining that the Board relied upon a consti-
tutionally permissible basis, (such as the vulgarity and unsuita-
bility of the film) to dismiss Ms. Fowler, even though it waspossible that impermissible motivations (i.e., an ideological dis-
94. Judge Peck additionally sought to bolster his argument for judicial deference in
this context by citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), but
it should be noted that Fraser involved more disruption of the classroom educational pro-
cess than Fowler. See id. at 3162.
95. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 669 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 666.
97. Id. at 669 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
98. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), quoted in Fowler, 819 F.2d at 670 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting). Courts have often quoted this passage without the qualifying language of"oftenness," as a flat relativist principle. See, e.g., State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 385
A.2d 642, 648 (1978). But cf. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 140 (1974)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to "the easy and imagined self-assurance that 'one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric."'). For philosophical background, see, e.g., RATIONALITY
AND RELATIVISM (M. Hollis & S. Lukes eds. 1983).
99. 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981).
100. See supra section II.
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taste for the "message" of the film) may have been "intertwined."
He simply concludes that "I do not believe an argument based
on intertwining [of permissible and impermissible motives] can
be used to suppress protected speech; vulgarity should not be
allowed to subsume that which is protected."'01
As discussed above, however, Judge Peck's argument in fact
relies not on any intertwining of motive, but on the (at least
partial) separability of permissible and impermissible motives.10 2
Judge Merritt does not explicitly challenge such a premise. His
conclusion also seems too categorical, if it is taken literally.
Especially in a public school context, it seems clear that at some
point, even vulgarity or violence that is considered essential to
the intended message, or to its full impact, could legitimately be
viewed as unacceptably extreme. One could, for example, un-
doubtedly make a coherent point about social alienation to a
captive or non-captive audience of ten-year-olds by exposing
them to the most gruesome sort of graphically filmed violence.
Presumably, an extreme of vulgarity is no more sacrosanct than
an extreme of violence. But it is probable that Judge Merritt
himself believes that some such limits to free speech are appro-
priate and can be imposed, at least in extreme cases.
V. CONCLUSION
All three opinions in Fowler enjoy substantial plausibility, but
all can be seen as ultimately flawed, at least at some level of
detail. Accordingly, Fowler reflects the fact that "the decided
cases fail to provide any comprehensive scheme for delineating
the role of the Constitution in resolving curricular and pedagog-
ical conflicts."'03 The decided cases often seem fact-sensitive in
this regard, so that no single case tends to have much controlling
101. Fowler, 819 F.2d at 670 (Merritt, J., dissenting). It should be borne in mind that the
major thrust of the argument against pedagogical vulgarity is not that the students have
never seen vulgar, violent, or sexual materials outside of class, and will be stunned by first
encountering them in the school, but rather that vulgarity ought not to be practically
legitimized through its use in the public school context.
102. Judge Merritt again refers to the "conflation of vulgarity and anti-establishment
ideas set forth by Judge Peck." Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
103. Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Sec-
ondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 54 (1983).
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power.1 4 If there is any mainstream position on this general
range of issues, it is perhaps best expressed by the view that
while "[t]he first amendment does not give to the teacher auton-
omy to determine either what or how he shall teach,"'10 5 this
general rule is subject to some range of exceptions. 10 6
It has been properly observed that "cases involving restrictions
on teachers' rights of curricular control are often erroneously
viewed as censorship cases when the real issue is who should
make curricular choices given the fact that someone has to make
[them]."'' 0 7 Such an observation gets the analysis off to a sensible
start, but in this fact-sensitive area of the law, it cannot contrib-
ute much to the resolution of a particular case. If one adds to
this the relevant idiosyncracies of the Fowler case, (the absence
of a genuinely relevant intent to speak, in a constitutional sense,
on the part of Ms. Fowler, the non-instructional character of the
school day,108 the dubious attempts at delegated editing,10 9 and
the apparently disproportionate severity of the punishment im-
posed), 10 one despairs of resolving Fowler on the basis of any
mechanical application of broad principles.
On the analysis recommended in this article, it is decisive in
resolving Fowler that there was an absence of any speech ad-
dressing a matter of public interest or concern. The plaintiff's
104. Among the lower court cases not extensively discussed in Fowler, and of admittedly
varying relevance, are cases such as Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d
1300 (7t'h Cir. 1980); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969);
Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), affd, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir.
1979); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), affid per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland,
316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
105. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of
Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1503 (1972).
106. See id.
107. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1356 (1976).
108. 819 F.2d at 658.
109. Id.
110. In view of the less than fully crystallized status of the law of substantive due
process, it is at least worth considering whether permanent dismissal, as opposed to a
lesser sanction, is a constitutionally permissible punishment in light of the nature and
quality of Ms. Fowler's alleged offense. See, e.g., Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507 (1986); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987)
(substantive due process right to continued public employment recognized); Crook v. Baker,
813 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1987).
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failure to meet that threshold requirement is fatal to her free
speech case. While it is, of course, possible to deny the legitimacy
of imposing such a requirement, doing so is consistent with the
scope of the broad run of values and purposes widely thought to
underlie the free speech clause in the first place."u
111. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963).
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